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Abstract
In this paper we illustrate the risk of non-monomorphicity
1
of re-
quirement specications
2
by an example from formal software devel-
opment. This example was completely carried out in the KIV system.
3
1 Introduction
Formal software development starts with making up a formal requirement
specication that describes the features required of the software system to
be developed. Requirement specications may be(come) an essential part
of a contract between a customer, who wants to get bug-free software for
his (safety-critical) application, and the software developer: the customer
assures to accept the software if (and only if) it meets this specication.
The requirement specication must not be monomorphic. Quite the re-
verse holds: in order to provide the software developer with freedom that

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1
A specication is called monomorphic if any two models of it are isomorphic. So a
monomorphic specication is either inconsistent or it determines some algebra uniquely
up to isomorphism.
2
In this paper we regard a requirement specication to be a formal description of
the expected external behavior of the software system. So, non-behavioral requirements
(concerning eciency, reliability, maintainability, portability, etc.) are not the subject of
our discussion.
3
KIV stands for Karlsruhe Interactive Verier, which is an advanced tool for the de-
velopment of correct software. It supports the entire design process starting from formal
specications and ending with veried code [9, 13].
1
may facilitate more ecient implementations, it may be desired to specify
only the relevant features. However, on the other hand, non-monomorphicity
(i.e. ambiguity) can be very dangerous, especially if one is unaware of the
(whole extent of the) gaps in the specication.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate two points: rstly, that in general,
it is in no way trivial to recognize gaps in a specication. Secondly, that
ambiguity of a requirement specication can have far-reaching, dire conse-
quences, even if this ambiguity is caused by gaps which are neither intended
nor easy to see. This illustration is done via a well-known
4
example, namely
the formal development of a prover for propositional logic.
We start out from the denition of validity in propositional logic given in
[4] and formalize it using a rst-order
5
specication language with (ultra-)
loose semantics.
6
This is done in the next section. In section 3 an executable
implementation is presented that meets this specication, but which behaves
not as intended. In section 4 we discuss the reason for this bad surprise:
concealed ambiguity of (parts of) the requirement specication. Section 5
illustrates the diculties in removing such ambiguity. Finally, in the last
section we draw conclusions and briey indicate directions for future work.
2 Specifying a Propositional Logic Prover
In this section we build up a requirement specication for a propositional logic
prover, i.e. a specication of syntax and semantics of propositional logic. As
basis we take the denitions given in ([4], p. 4-7) and formalize them (as
literally as possible) in a rst-order specication language (enlarged with
generation principles). We start with the syntax of propositional formulas,
which is dened in ([4], p. 5) as follows:
7
\We now set up the propositional logic as a formal language. The
symbols of our language are as follows:
connectives ^ (and), : (not);
parentheses ),(;
a nonempty set S of signature symbols
4
This example was already treated (however, with another aim in mind) e.g. in [3, 19],
and also in the KIV system [17].
5
enlarged with generation principles (a kind of higher-order axioms).
6
In the ultra-loose approach to algebraic specication all models of a specication are
considered; whereas in the loose approach exactly those models are considered which do not
contain junk, i.e. all models whose elements can be denoted by ground terms. However, for
the specications presented in this paper the loose and the ultra-loose semantics coincide
since the specications contain generation principles for all their sorts. The loose semantics
approach to algebraic specication is widely accepted as appropriate for specication of
software systems (see for instance [6, 20, 11]).
7
Here and in what follows we quote [4] almost literally. Modications concern the
replacement of `sentential' by `propositional', and `statement' by `formula'.
2
Intuitively, the signature symbols stand for atomic formulas, and the
connectives ^, : stand for the words used to combine atomic formulas
into compound formulas. Formally, the formulas of S are dened as
follows:
(i). Every signature symbol S is a formula.
(ii). If ' is a formula then (:') is a formula.
(iii). If ' and  are formulas then (' ^  ) is a formula.
(iv). A nite sequence of symbols is a formula only if it can be shown
to be a formula by a nite number of applications of (i)-(iii)."
In order to formalize this denition, we (slightly) restrict it by demanding
that the propositional signature S (i.e. the set of atomic formulas) is innite
and enumerable, or even more concrete, we put
S := f S
n
j n 2 IN g
where we assume S
i
6= S
j
whenever i 6= j. Thus, we are allowed to specify
the syntax of propositional formulas as follows:
8
specication FORMULA
using NAT
sorts formula
functions S : nat ! formula
:
0
 : formula ! formula
 ^
0
 : formula  formula ! formula
variables ',  : formula
axioms formula freely generated by S, :
0
, ^
0
end specication
Propositional formulas are represented by terms of the sort formula, which
are built from the constructor functions S, :
0
and ^
0
. In order to rule out
conicts with the logical connectives of rst-order logic (which is a subset of
the specication language used here), we have attached a prime (
0
) at the
symbols :
0
and ^
0
. The dots () after :
0
, and before and after ^
0
indicate
that :
0
will be used in prex notation and ^
0
in inx notation. The sole
axiom is a strengthening of the generation principle
formula generated by S, :
0
, ^
0
which is a kind of higher-order axiom. It restricts the class of models of the
specication to those in which each object of the domain can be denoted by
8
The specication NAT of natural numbers used here is given below.
3
a constructor term, i.e. by a ground term built from the constructors S, :
0
,
^
0
(plus the constructors for the sort nat). The addition freely means that
any two distinct constructor terms denote distinct objects.
The specication NAT of natural numbers used here can be specied as
follows (the symbol +1 denotes the successor function, written postx):
specication NAT
sorts nat
functions 0 : ! nat
 +1 : nat ! nat
variables n, m : nat
axioms nat freely generated by 0, +1
end specication
This concludes the specication of the syntax of propositional logic. We now
turn to its semantics. In ([4], p. 4) we nd the following [motivation for the]
denition of the class of models for propositional logic.
\At the most intuitive level, an intended interpretation of these
formulas is a `possible world', in which each formula is either true or
false. We wish to replace these intuitive interpretations by a collection
of precise mathematical objects which we may use as our models.
The rst thing which comes to mind is a function F which associates
with each atomic formula S one of the truth values `true' or `false'.
Stripping away the inessentials, we shall instead take a model to be
a subset A of S; the idea is that S 2 A indicates that the atomic
formula S is true, and S 62 A indicates that the atomic formula S is
false.
By a model A of S we simply mean a subset A of S."
Again, we slightly modify this denition in order to t our purpose. For the
rst modication we make use of the fact that we are interested in validity
of (nite sets of) nite formulas only (see rest of this section). Therefore (cf.
[4]), it is sucient to regard nite models only, i.e. nite subsets of atomic
formulas. The second modication concerns representation issues only. Since
we have restricted ourself to S = fS
n
j n 2 INg with S
i
6= S
j
whenever i 6= j,
we can represent a atomic formula S
n
by its index n. So, instead of taking
a model to be a subset of atomic formulas, it is more convenient for us to
represent a modelA as the set of indices of atomic formulas. Thus, we specify
a model A to be a nite subset of natural numbers. As operations on models
we take the constructors
9
empty set (;) and insertion of an element (), and
9
Notice, that the data type of models (i.e. nite sets) is not freely generated: for
instance, the distinct ground terms 0  ; and 0  0  ; denote the same object.
4
the membership predicate (2), where n 2 A indicates that S
n
is true in A
and n 62 A indicates that S
n
is false in A.
specication MODEL
using NAT
sorts model
functions ; : ! model
   : nat  model ! model
predicates  2  : nat  model
variables A, B : model
axioms model generated by ;, 
; 6= n  A (1)
n  m  A = m  n  A (2)
n  n  A = n  A (3)
n 2 A $ n  A = A (4)
end specication
The rst axiom of this specication states the generatedness by ; and inser-
tion (). The other axioms can be read as:
(1) By inserting an arbitrary element to an arbitrary set we get a set dis-
tinct from the empty set.
(2) The order of insertion is irrelevant.
(3) Inserting an element twice yields the same result as inserting it once.
(4) An element is member of a set if and only if this set is not changed by
insertion of the element.
It is quite obvious, that all these axioms hold in the intended algebra (which
is the algebra of nite sets on natural numbers).
After we have specied what we mean by a model, it remains to formalize
the notion of validity of a formula. As above we quote the denition from
([4], p. 7):
\We are now ready to build a bridge between the language S and
its models, with the denition of the truth of a formula in a model. We
shall express the fact that a formula ' is true in a model A succinctly
by the special notation
A j= ':
The relation A j= ' is dened as follows:
5
(i). If ' is a signature symbol S, then A j= ' holds if and only if
S 2 A.
(ii). If ' is  ^ , then A j= ' if and only if both A j=  and A j= .
(iii). If ' is : , then A j= ' i it is not the case that A j=  .
When A j= ', we say that [: : : ] A is a model of '.
A formula ' is called valid, in symbols j= ', i ' holds in all
models for S, that is, i A j= ' for all A."
The translation of this denition into rst-order logic is completely straight-
forward.
10
In fact, the individual parts of it have one-to-one equivalents in
the following specication.
specication VALIDITY
using FORMULA, MODEL
predicates  j=  : model  formula
 is valid : formula
axioms A j= S(n) $ n 2 A
A j= (:
0
') $ : A j= '
A j= (' ^
0
 ) $ A j= ' ^ A j=  
' is valid $ 8 A . A j= '
end specication
This concludes our specication of syntax and semantics of propositional
logic. Its structure is illustrated in gure 1.
We hope, that the reader agrees that we have built up the requirement
specication very carefully. Especially, one could (or even should) be con-
vinced that any prover for propositional logic, which can be veried against
this specication is a correct one.
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Figure 1: structure of the requirement specication.
(The arrows indicate the `using' relation.)
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Here we benet from using full rst-order logic. A formalization without quantiers
would be more complicated (cf. [3]).
6
3 Implementing the Specied Prover
In this section we put ourselves in the place of the software developer. In do-
ing so, we no longer have to think about what it means for an implementation
to be correct. This is already formalized in the requirement specication, i.e.
an implementation is regarded as correct whenever it meets this specication.
What the software developer has to think about is optimization of qualities
like veriability and eciency.
11
A clever software developer may state the following procedures as part
12
of an implementation of the requirement specication:
VALIDITY-CHECKER (phi : formula ;var b : boolean)
begin
var b
1
, b
2
: boolean in
VALIDITY-CHECKER-H (true , phi ; b
1
);
VALIDITY-CHECKER-H (false , phi ; b
2
);
b := b
1
and b
2
end.
VALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
: boolean , phi : formula ;var b : boolean)
begin
if phi is atomic then b := b
0
else if phi is negation then
begin
VALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi.negated formula ; b);
b := not b
end
else if phi is conjunction then
begin
var b
1
, b
2
: boolean in
VALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi.rst conjunct ; b
1
);
VALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi.second conjunct ; b
2
);
b := b
1
and b
2
end
else abort
end.
These procedures might not look as the reader expected, but concerning ver-
iability, eciency and correctness this implementation turns out to be a
good one. This claim will be substantiated in some detail below. First we
11
Often ease of veriability and eciency contradict each other, and one has to be
content with a compromise.
12
The complete implementation is given in appendix A.
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have to explain the data structures the procedures work on. We describe
data structures as so-called data specications. Data specications are spec-
ications of freely generated data types with selectors for each parameter of a
constructor and optional predicates for each construct. In a highly compact
notion the data specications used in the implementation look as follows:
data specication FORMULA-DATA
using NAT-DATA
formula =
S (  .index : nat ) with  is atomic
j :
0
 (  .negated formula : formula ) with  is negation
j  ^
0
 (  .rst conjunct : formula ,
 .second conjunct : formula ) with  is conjunction
variables ',  : formula
end data specication
data specication NAT-DATA
nat = 0
j  +1 (   1 : nat )
variables n, m : nat
end data specication
data specication BOOL-DATA
boolean = true j false
variables b : boolean
end data specication
To illustrate the semantics of such data specications we point out that the
specication FORMULA-DATA can be regarded as a compact notion for the
specication one gets from enriching the above specication FORMULA by
the following selector functions and predicates:
functions  .index : formula ! nat
 .negated formula : formula ! formula
 .rst conjunct : formula ! formula
 .second conjunct : formula ! formula
axioms S(n).index = n
(:
0
').negated formula = '
(' ^
0
 ).rst conjunct = '
(' ^
0
 ).second conjunct =  
8
predicates  is atomic : formula
 is negation : formula
 is conjunction : formula
axioms S(n) is atomic
: (:
0
') is atomic
: (' ^
0
 ) is atomic
: S(n) is negation
(:
0
') is negation
: (' ^
0
 ) is negation
: S(n) is conjunction
: (:
0
') is conjunction
(' ^
0
 ) is conjunction
Data specications are consistent per construction, and code implementing
them can be automatically generated.
13
So our implementation is in fact
executable. Furthermore the implementation meets the requirement speci-
cation. This claim is substantiated in the next section; in appendix A we
sketch a formal correctness proof, which was carried out in the KIV system.
We can hope that the verication of our implementation causes no dicul-
ties, because the procedures are quite simple. In fact, as you can look up
in appendix A, this hope was proved to be well-founded: the verication
with the KIV system could be done with a high degree of automation and in
about half an hour. Even concerning the eciency aspect, our implementa-
tion looks quite nice: the amount of time required by VALIDITY-CHECKER
is linear in the size of the input formula.
14
So we have done our job and the customer will be enjoyed about the
results, especially concerning eciency and the surprisingly small eort of
time (which means money) needed for carrying out the verication. However,
he will be frustrated about the fact that his veried prover insists that the
formula : (S
0
^ : S
1
) is a valid one. Presumably, this causes a lasting
damage of his condence in formal methods for software engineering.
4 What has gone Wrong?
We see us confronted with the unpleasant situation that we have formally
specied and veried a program, but which turns out to behave not as in-
tended. What has gone wrong? Several potential reasons come to mind:
13
Cf. e.g. the defstruct construct in the programming language LISP.
14
However, this insight should make suspicious, since the validity check problem of
propositional logic is known to be NP-complete (see e.g. [2]).
9
1. There is a defect in the informal specication we started from.
2. The formal specication does not correspond to the informal specica-
tion.
3. The verication is not correct, i.e. some `proofs' are not real proofs.
We hope that the reader agrees with us, that the rst potential reason can
be ruled out: we have adopted the informal specication from ([4], p. 4-7)
with very little modications. Concerning the last potential reason we point
out that a formal verication has been completely done in the KIV system
(cf. appendix A). This gives us reason to trust the proofs.
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For the second potential reason we call to mind that we have constructed
the formal specication very carefully, and quite close along the informal
specication (see section 2). Indeed, reviewing the specication (again and
again) leads to the conviction that there isn't any faulty axiom. So everything
looks ne.
However, and this is just the thing we want to illustrate on the example,
checking the correctness of the axioms is not enough for ensuring adequate-
ness of the specication, but a kind of completeness has to be guaranteed too.
To be more concrete, one has to make sure that the specication does not
permit any non-intended interpretations. Otherwise there is no guarantee
that an implementation which is proved to meet the specication, behaves
actually as desired. This is exactly what has gone wrong in our formal de-
velopment of the propositional logic prover: the implementation embodies a
non-intended interpretation of the requirement specication.
But the worst thing about it is, that (see end of section 2) we have been
unaware of the whole extent of this ambiguity of the specication, and its
far-reaching consequences. The ambiguity is caused by gaps, which are far
from being completely obvious to see.
16
In our example the root of all evil is in the specication of models, i.e. of
nite sets on natural numbers. It permits non-intended interpretations, for
instance an interpretation A
MODEL
, which has exactly the two elements
17
;
and IN in its domain. The insert operation  is interpreted by A
MODEL
as
follows: `inserting' any element n in ; or IN results in IN. This is illustrated
in the following gure:
15
Here we assume the correctness of KIV-produced proofs, i.e. the correctness of the
kernel of the KIV system. For a discussion on how to guarantee correctness of deduction
systems see [1, 16].
16
The reader is invited to try to nd them, before continuing.
17
We hope that no confusion arises from using symbols, as ;, on syntactical and on
semantical level.
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"!
# 
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# 
-
;
IN
n  
$
%
'
?
n  
The membership predicate is interpreted by A
MODEL
as one might expect:
2
A
MODEL
:= f (n; IN) j n 2 IN g :
The reader should convince oneself, that A
MODEL
is in fact a model of the
specication MODEL, i.e. that it does not conict with any of the axioms.
LetA be a model of the overall requirement specication, which interprets
the sub-specication MODEL as A
MODEL
. (It can be shown that such a
model A actually exists.) Then, because of the axiom
' is valid $ 8 A . A j= '
validity (i.e. the predicate is valid) is interpreted by A as follows:
A formula is valid if and only if it holds in the empty model
(which evaluates all atomic formulas to false) and in the total
model (which evaluates all atomic formulas to true).
Surely, this does not coincide with our intuitive understanding of validity,
but this is exactly what the procedure VALIDITY-CHECKER checks.
5 Completing the specication
To summarize the above section, we have located the reason for the unex-
pected behavior of the veried implementation in the non-monomorphicity of
the specication MODEL. So, the gaps in this specication should be lled
by adding appropriate axioms. Here two questions arise: rstly, how can we
nd such appropriate axioms, and secondly, how do we come to know that
we can stop adding further axioms, i.e. that the specication in question is
already monomorphic. This section is intended to illustrate the diculty of
these questions; a possible answer to them is sketched in the conclusion.
The non-intended interpretation A
MODEL
can be taken as hint which
axioms to add to the specication of models. For instance, we may want
to exclude interpretations, which contain models for which the membership
relation is true for every natural number (e.g. inA
MODEL
the model denoted
by IN). This can be done by adding the axiom
9 n . n  A 6= A:
11
However, is this enough? The answer is no! Again, there exist non-intended
interpretations. For example, B
MODEL
with domain
n
;
o
[
n
M [ f1g


 M  IN nite
o
In B
MODEL
inserting any natural number n to a set is interpreted as in-
serting not only n, but in addition the natural number 1. So f1g is the
only singleton set in B
MODEL
. The membership predicate is interpreted by
B
MODEL
as usual. Let B be a model of the overall requirement specication,
which interprets the sub-specication MODEL as B
MODEL
. Then, validity
is interpreted by B as follows:
A formula is valid if and only if it holds in the empty model and
in all models which evaluate S
1
to true.
Implementing this interpretation would result in a program that meets the
requirement specication, but again claims the validity of : (S
0
^ : S
1
).
Taking B
MODEL
as hint, we may add a further axiom, e.g. :
n  m  A = m  A ! n = m _ n  A = A
Eventually, this results in a monomorphic specication of models.
18
The
reader is doing right to ask, how we get to this insight. We refer him to the
next section.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have given an example that illustrates two points: rstly that, even if
the requirement specication is constructed very carefully, one is (without
taking further measures) not safe from ambiguity. Secondly, ambiguity (even
if quite inconspicuous) can have unpleasant, inestimable consequences. The
conclusion is, that without taking further measures one has to reckon on
unpleasant, inestimable consequences.
What does this mean for application of formal methods in practice? As-
sume that customer and software developer agree about a formal requirement
specication in the sense indicated in the introduction. Then the software
developer is always sitting pretty, if he succeeds in verifying that his software
meets the specication. However, as illustrated above, the customer can not
be sure that this software behaves as he has intended. Therefore, in order
to be safe from bad surprises, the customer should insist on a monomorphic
requirement specication.
19
This opinion is also taken e.g. in ([10], p. 1049):
18
Adding only this axiom (and not 9 n . n  A 6= A) to the specication MODEL would
already result in a monomorphic specication.
19
This requirement can be weakened (especially in order to facilitate ecient implemen-
tations). With this we have in mind, that gaps in requirement specications must not be
completely forbidden, but that it is sucient to make them explicit.
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\A well-written software requirement specication (SRS) reduces
the probability of the customer being disappointed with the nal prod-
uct. The SRS denes the external behavior of the system to be built
unambiguously, so there can be no misinterpretation. If there is a dis-
agreement between customer and developer concerning external be-
havior, it is worked out during the requirements stage, not during
acceptance testing, when it is much more costly to correct. Unfortu-
nately many developers prefer to keep the SRS fairly ambiguous in
order to provide themselves with more exibility during design. How-
ever, this exibility signicantly increases the customer's risk."
The question arises how to guarantee that a specication is monomor-
phic. Unfortunately, in general
20
monomorphicity is neither easy to see nor
decidable at all. The set of all monomorphic specications is not even ef-
fectively enumerable. However, it is possible to prove monomorphicity of a
given specication, for example by meta-reasoning [11, 15]. Currently we
investigate a method that reduces the task of proving monomorphicity to
a task of proving certain properties of programs [18]. This allows one to
directly employ well-established techniques known from software verication
(as implemented e.g. in the KIV system).
Another important question concerns the construction of monomorphic
specications: how can a given specication be made monomorphic, i.e. how
to nd appropriate axioms which ll the gaps in it. Maybe, one can get
valuable hints for appropriate axioms by trying to prove monomorphicity
of the non-monomorphic specication and analyzing the subgoals where the
proof attempt gets stuck.
21
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If one restricts oneself to freely generated data types enriched by algorithmic speci-
cations, the things get much simpler, since in this case, determinism and totality of these
algorithms are sucient for monomorphicity.
21
Adding some appropriate axioms will enable us to do some more proof steps, but again
we may get stuck, and hope to get valuable hints from analyzing the open subgoals, etc.
So, the monomorphicity proof and the specication are completed step by step and hand
in hand. This method may be titled as synthesis of specications or specifying by proving.
13
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A Verifying the Implementation
In section 3 we have presented only a part of the implementation, namely
the procedures (with data structures FORMULA-DATA, BOOL-DATA) im-
plementing the is valid predicate. In the following is presented, how the
other sorts and operations of the requirement specication are implemented.
The sorts and operations of the sub-specications FORMULA and NAT are
implemented by identity, i.e. by their corresponding sorts and operations of
the data specications FORMULA-DATA and NAT-DATA. The rest of the
requirement specication is implemented as follows:
boolean implements model
EMPTY-SET implements ;
INSERT implements 
MEMBER implements 2
VALIDITY-CHECKER-H implements j=
VALIDITY-CHECKER implements is valid
Here VALIDITY-CHECKER and VALIDITY-CHECKER-H are the procedures
presented in section 3. It remains to give the (fairly tricky) declarations of
the procedures EMPTY-SET, INSERT and MEMBER:
EMPTY-SET (var b : boolean)
begin
b := false
end.
INSERT (n : nat , b
0
: boolean ;var b : boolean)
begin
b := true
end.
MEMBER (n : nat , b
0
: boolean ;var b : boolean)
begin
b := b
0
end.
Now, what we want to prove here is that this implementation meets the
requirement specication given in section 2, which is the case if all procedures
terminate and exhibit the behavior specied in the axioms of the requirement
specication.
22
This conditions can be formulated in dynamic logic [7, 8],
22
See [12, 14] for details of the more general approach to correctness of modular software
systems, that is taken in the KIV system.
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which is done automatically in the KIV system. In the following we list
the KIV-generated proof obligations. The rst ve of them express that the
procedures terminate:
(1) termination of procedure EMPTY-SET:
hEMPTY-SET (; b)i true
(2) termination of procedure INSERT:
hINSERT (n , b
0
; b)i true
(3) termination of procedure MEMBER:
hMEMBER (n , b
0
; b)i true
(4) termination of procedure VALIDITY-CHECKER-H:
hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi ; b)i true
(5) termination of procedure VALIDITY-CHECKER:
hVALIDITY-CHECKER (phi ; b)i true
The following conditions express that the procedures exhibit the behavior
specied in the requirement specication: every axiom of the specications
MODEL and VALIDITY is translated into a proof obligation:
(6) procedures satisfy \; 6= n  A":
: hEMPTY-SET (; b
1
)i hINSERT (n , b
0
; b
2
)i b
1
= b
2
(7) procedures satisfy \n  m  A = m  n  A":
hINSERT (n , b
0
; b
1
)i hINSERT (m , b
1
; b
2
)i
hINSERT (m , b
0
; b
3
)i hINSERT (n , b
3
; b
4
)i b
2
= b
4
(8) procedures satisfy \n  n  A = n  A":
hINSERT (n , b
0
; b
1
)i hINSERT (n , b
1
; b
2
)i
hINSERT (n , b
0
; b
3
)i b
2
= b
3
(9) procedures satisfy \n 2 A $ n  A = A":
hMEMBER (n , b
0
; b)i b = true $ hINSERT (n , b
0
; b)i b = b
0
(10) procedures satisfy \A j= S(n) $ n 2 A":
hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, S(n) ; b)i b = true $
hMEMBER (n , b
0
; b)i b = true
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(11) procedures satisfy \A j= (:
0
') $ : A j= '":
hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
,:
0
phi ; b)i b = true $
: hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi ; b)i b = true
(12) procedures satisfy \A j= (' ^
0
 ) $ A j= ' ^ A j=  ":
hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi ^
0
psi ; b)i b = true $
hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi ; b)i b = true ^
hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, psi ; b)i b = true
(13) procedures satisfy \' is valid $ 8 A . A j= '":
hVALIDITY-CHECKER (phi ; b)i b = true $
8 b
0
. hVALIDITY-CHECKER-H (b
0
, phi ; b)i b = true
The last condition expresses that the procedures implementing the construc-
tors of the sort model satisfy the generation principle for the sort model:
(14) procedures satisfy \model generated by ;, ":
hGENERATE-MODEL (b ; )i true
Here GENERATE-MODEL is a procedure, which has a terminating run ex-
actly for those input values that can be constructed by nitely many ap-
plications of the procedures EMPTY-SET and INSERT. Such a procedure
is automatically generated by the KIV system (n := ? and b
1
:= ? are
indeterministic assignments):
GENERATE-MODEL (b : boolean ; )
begin
var b
0
: boolean in
EMPTY-SET (; b
0
);
if b
0
= b then skip
else var n : nat, b
1
: boolean in
n := ? ; b
1
:= ?;
GENERATE-MODEL (b
1
; );
INSERT (n , b
1
; b
0
);
if b
0
= b then skip else abort
end.
We briey sketch the proofs for all the obligations (1) { (14). The proce-
dures EMPTY-SET, INSERT, and MEMBER contain no calls of recursive pro-
cedures, so they can always be unfolded. This unfolding is enough for proving
(1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), and (9). The proof of (4) works by structural
induction
23
on the input formula phi and simple symbolic execution. While
23
This induction is permitted because there is a corresponding generation principle in
the specication FORMULA-DATA.
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this symbolic execution exactly these calls of VALIDITY-CHECKER-H are
unfolded, which have as input formula a term that is not merely a variable
(i.e. which has some structure). (5) can be reduced to (4). The proofs for
(10), (11), and (12) work by symbolic execution (the same way as in the
proof for (4)). In addition, for (11) the (already proven) theorem (4) about
the termination of VALIDITY-CHECKER-H is useful. Proving (13) can be
done by unfolding the denition of VALIDITY-CHECKER and employing that
a boolean is either true or false. For (14) we have to show that for each in-
put value b there is a terminating run of GENERATE-MODEL (b ; ). This
can be done by executing the procedure call and choosing b
1
= false in the
random assignment. So the recursive call does not run in the else-case, and
termination is trivial.
These proofs have been carried out in the KIV system. All together they
took 175 rule applications, where the KIV system found 168 of them (i.e.
96%) on its own.
24
The remaining interactive proof steps are quite natu-
ral, especially they have one-to-one equivalences in the above informal proof
sketches (e.g. inserting a lemma or choosing b
1
= false in the random assign-
ment while proving (14)). No auxiliary lemmas were required.
25
Carrying
out this case-study took about 2 hours of interactive work with the KIV
system (1.5 hours for setting up the specication and implementation, and
about 0.5 hours for the verication).
24
This degree of automation can even be increased by making more extensive use of
specic heuristics.
25
Thus, this case-study is an extremely atypical application of the KIV system. See [5]
for more typical and more impressing case-studies carried out within the KIV system.
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